Alcune considerazioni sul rapporto tra semantica e metafisica nella teoria degli eventi di Kim

La teoria degli eventi che Kim delinea \ue8 considerata una delle pi\uf9 influenti teorie metafisiche de- gli eventi. In questo lavoro si presenta tale teoria e si esamina la sua plausibilit\ue0. In particolare, si indaga la tesi semantica di Kim secon- do cui due nominali per eventi sono coreferenziali solo se le espres- sioni predicative che essi contengono stanno per la stessa propriet\ue0. Inoltre, si esamina i) se gli eventi concepiti alla Kim debbano essere distinti dai fatti e ii) quali sono i motivi per cui tale teoria d\ue0 luogo ad una implausibile moltiplicazione degli eventi

Objects, Events, and Property-Instances

The theory of events as property-instances has been considered one of the most widely accepted metaphysical theories of events. On the other hand, several philosophers claim that if both events and objects perdure, then objects must be identified with events. In this work, I investigate whether these two views can be held together. I shall argue that if they can, it depends on the particular theory of instantiation one is to adopt. In particular, I shall conclude that the theory of events as property-instances and the view that identifies objects with events can be held together only if instances of eventive universals are temporal parts of objects – namely, those temporal parts that have the universals in question

Achille C. Varzi, Claudio Calosi, Le tribolazioni del filosofare

open1noRecensione del volume "Le tribolazioni del Filosofare. Comedia Metaphysica ne la quale si tratta de li errori e de le pene de l’Infero" di Achille C. Varzi e Claudio CalosiopenBaratella, RiccardoBaratella, Riccard

Alcune considerazioni sul rapporto tra semantica e metafisica nella teoria degli eventi di Kim

La teoria degli eventi che Kim, (1966, 1969, 1973, 1976) delinea è considerata una delle più influenti teorie metafisiche degli eventi. In questo lavoro si presenta tale teoria e si esamina la sua plausibilità. In particolare, si indaga la tesi semantica di Kim secondo cui due nominali per eventi sono coreferenziali solo se le espressioni predicative che essi contengono stanno per la stessa proprietà. Inoltre, si esamina i) se gli eventi concepiti alla Kim debbano essere distinti dai fatti e ii) quali sono i motivi per cui tale teoria dà luogo ad una implausibile moltiplicazione degli eventi

Processes and events as rigid embodiments

Monists and pluralists disagree concerning how many ordinary objects there are in a single situation. For instance, pluralists argue that a statue and the clay it is made of have different properties, and thereby are different. The standard monist’s response is to hold that there is just a single object, and that, under the description “being a statue”, this object is, e.g., aesthetically valuable, and that, under the description “being a piece of clay”, it is not aesthetically valuable. However, Fine provided an ontological reading of the expression “an object under a description”: the theory of rigid embodiments. The debate between monists and pluralists reduplicates in the domain of ordinary occurrences, like walks and conferences. Specifically, they disagree whether an occurrence in progress (also called “process”) like John’s walk that is happening at tn is identical to some completed occurrence (also called “event”) like John’s walk that happened between, e.g., t1 and tn. Under the adoption of the pluralist’s position, the article aims to provide a novel theory of ordinary occurrences that develops the ontological reading of “under a description” to account for occurrences in progress and completed occurrences. As a first result, we formulate a theory according to which both occurrences in progress and completed occurrences are rigid embodiments. As a second result, we argue that the suggested theory is explanatorily powerful to the extent it solves two puzzles that we call “the Puzzle from the Completion of a Process” and “the Metaphysical-cum-Semantical Puzzle”

Un mondo di eventi

The dissertation’s starting point is the intuitive distinction between events, conceived of as things that happen, and material objects, conceived of as things that participate in events. This distinction raises two connected metaphysical questions: how can the relation of being involved in which holds between material objects and events be adequately characterized? Which is the relation of being ontologically prior than which holds between material objects and events? The Thesis “A World of Events” tries to give an answer to such questions in seven chapters. In Chapter 1 necessary and plausibly jointly sufficient conditions will be established for identifying, respectively, an entity as a material object or as an event. The fundamental questions which have justified this research presuppose the existence of events; however, some arguments in literature have been put forth against the existence of such a kind of entities. In the first part of Chapter 2 the arguments against the existence of events advanced by Aune (1977) and Horgan (1978) will be examined. Thereafter, an argumentative strategy for blocking those arguments will be devised. The subject of Chapeter 3 is the notion of ontological priority. In the first part of the chapter some requirements will be provided which every adequate characterization of the notion of ontological priority has to satisfy. Afterwards, a characterization of the notions of ontological priority and ontological dependence which are based on Fine’s (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) and Correia’s (2006) works and which satisfy the requirements settled for the notion of ontological priority will be developed. In the literature some arguments have been designed aiming at providing some constraints which the adequate theories of events have to fulfil. In Chapter 4 such constraints are summed up in two requirements: requirement R1), according to which a material object is an entity which participates in events: a material object enters as a participant in events through which it always remains the same; and requirement R2), according to which events ontologically depend upon the material objects which participate in them. In Chapters 5 and 6 two theories which plausibly satisfy such requirements will be examined: the theory of events as exemplifications of properties or relations and the theory of events as particular and non-substantial ways of being. Particularly, in Chapter 5 two objections raised against the theory of events as exemplifications of properties or relations will be considered and a new version of this theory of events which blocks these objections will be proposed. In the first part of Chapter 7 the validity of requirements R1) and R2) and the correctness of the arguments whence requirements R1) and R2) have been derived will be questioned. Subsequently, the plausibility of a theory of events which fails to satisfy requirements R1) and R2) will be inquired: Quine’s theory of events. This theory of events identifies events and material objects. The argumentative strategy is as follows: first of all, two theoretical costs of Quine’s theory will be highlighted; then Quine’s theory will be defended against an objection proposed by Paul (2000)

Processes and their modal profile

A widely debated issue in contemporary metaphysics is whether the modal profile of ordinary objects has to be explained in non-modal terms (that is, Thesis 1). However, how to solve such an issue with respect to occurrences – namely, processes and events – is a question that has been largely neglected in the current metaphysical debate. The general goal of this article is to start filling this gap. As a first result of the article, we make it plausible that, if Thesis 1 holds for objects, then it also holds for processes and events. Then, we develop a metaphysical account of processes derived from Fine’s (1999, 2022) suggestions, according to which a process is a variable embodiment that is manifested by different events at the different times it goes on – namely, Thesis 2. We raised the challenge from the completion of a process that asks the Finean account of processes to explain relevant modal features of processes in non-modal terms. As a second result, we argue that four initially plausible strategies for solving such a challenge fall short of solving it. As a third result, we show that the theory of variable embodiments Fine formulates for objects must differ from the theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes. We conclude by investigating some revisions to a theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes

Are There Occurrent Continuants? A Reply to Stout’s “The Category of Occurrent Continuants”

Processes are occurrents that were, are, or will be happening. They endure or they perdure, i.e. they are either “fully” present at every time they happen, or they rather have temporal parts. According to Stout (2016), they endure. His argument assumes that processes may change. Then, Stout argues that, if something changes, it endures. As I show, Stout’s Argument misses its target. In particular, it makes use of a notion of change that is either intuitive but illegitimate or technical but question-begging

Towards an Understanding of the Principle of Variable Embodiments

The theory of variable embodiments has been primarily formulated to model ordinary objects as things that change their parts over time. A variable embodiment /f/ is a sui generis whole constructed from a principle f, the principle of a variable embodiment, and it is manifested at different times by different things picked out by such a principle f. This principle is usually clarified as a function that picks out, at any given time the variable embodiment exists, its corresponding manifestation at that time, and it fails to pick out anything at any other time. The first purpose of this article is to examine and refute three natural understandings of such a principle. Specifically, first, we argue against the view that it should be understood extensionally as either a partial function or total function. Next, we provide some motivations to reject the understanding of the principle as a function in intensional terms, where the notion of intension is analyzed in terms of a specific version of a possible world semantics. The second goal of the article is to make it plausible that the principle has an intensional character and, on the basis of the results achieved, to formulate some constraints that an account of such a principle should meet

On the adequacy of requirements for foundational ontologies

In this very issue, Augusto (2022) formulates two requirements upon which to evaluate the adequacy of a foundational ontology. Specifically, the ontological categories: (i) should be understood as the most general kinds of things and (ii) are organized in a non-overlapping finite hierarchy. On the basis of such constraints, he claims that most existing foundational ontologies engineered in the context of Applied Ontology, including the UFO-B ontology, are inadequate. In this article, first we show that his objection against UFO-B can be dissipated by pointing to a trivial terminological confusion. We then argue that his two constraints are not plausible. Then, we show that the disagreement between our point of view and Augusto’s framework is not restricted to those two constraints but extends over the notion of conceptualization of reality